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The SIRC column
How the squeeze on
standards enables
small flags to flourish
Nik Winchester of the Seafarers
International Research Centre looks
at the difference between the
established open registers and some
of the new arrivals on the scene
WHEN we see the flags flown by
ships, and the ports of registry
painted on their sterns, we notice
that most of them are attached to
such places as Panama and
Liberia, Bahamas and Malta. We
take them for granted because
they have become so familiar and
so numerous even though we
may find it difficult to connect
these flags with our under-
standing of what constitutes a
proper maritime nation.
In recent years a number of
other flags have arrived on the
scene from countries that are not
so familiar, such as Belize, Bolivia,
Cambodia, and Equatorial
Guinea. Since the registers of
ships attached to these flags have
shown extremely rapid growth
rates over their short lifespans, it
is reasonable to wonder why this
growth has occurred and what
the consequences might be.
The initial response to these
new arrivals is simply to see them
as yet further examples of open
registers or flags of convenience.
After all, don’t all open registers
operate in the same manner?
Well no, they don’t. Not any
longer. In the wake of a long
series of tanker disasters begin-
ning, perhaps, with the Torrey
Canyon in the late 1960s and
culminating in March in the two
halves of the Kristal adrift off
northern Spain, the world has
developed a regulatory system
aimed at chasing ships com-
monly found on the flag of
convenience registers. The big
registers such as Panama and
Liberia, which are also big
businesses, have been obliged to
develop tighter practices. And so
the situation in respect of these
new flags is less straightforward
than it first appears, because these
new registers have had to find a
market niche which does not
involve them in competing with
the established giants in the flag
industry.
Shipowners like to cite cost as
the key reason for choosing to
register a ship under a particular
flag. Certainly, when looked at in
simple cost terms, these new
registers display similar qualities
to their much bigger brothers and
sisters.
Essentially, they make it
possible for seafaring labour to be
procured from anywhere in the
world; they offer tax regimes
which are low or non-existent;
and there are no extensive
regulatory requirements placed
upon the ships’ owners.
But there are several ways in
which these new registers differ
from their established peers. The
most immediately obvious
difference is that they have far
fewer regulatory restrictions than
those required by the big flags of
convenience. Certainly a
shipowner resorting to any of
these new flags may choose to
fulfil all international require-
ments. But the flag administra-
tions – if they may actually be
called that - make it plain that
this is a matter for the shipowners
themselves and that they, the
“administrators”, are in practice
indifferent as to levels of compli-
ance with international conven-
tions.
This practice of passing
responsibility for regulatory
compliance has, or course, been
common among open registers
but, as we have seen, the larger
registries have begun to place
higher expectations upon their
shipowner clients. This regula-
tory squeeze has driven out the
more marginal owners who have
gone in search of (or, in some
cases, actually helped to set up)
new flag registries. In short, the
raison d’être of these registers is
the provision of a regulation free
environment for the shipowner.
The very success of these flags
depends on the continued and
anticipated maintenance of a flag
state completely uninterested in
regulatory enforcement. It is also
worth noting that, where the
larger flag of convenience
registers are anxious to demon-
strate their regulatory credentials,
the registration requirements for
these new registers are organised
in such a way as to shelter the
shipowner from any enforce-
ment procedures which other
regulators may seek to apply. That
is to say the flag state neither
attempts to impinge upon the
autonomy of the shipowner, nor
specifies any link between the flag
and the state. In other words, and
in the cases of the new registries,
the state as regulator is absent.
The administrations of Belize,
Bolivia, Cambodia and Equatorial
Guinea have no legal means of
requiring a shipowner’s compli-
ance with international
standards.
The new registries are pretty
obviously a commercial response
to the new flag market paradoxi-
cally opened up by the world-
wide pressure for higher opera-
tional standards in shipping. The
limited success of port state
control as a means of enforcing
international regulations has
been well documented. Yet how-
ever limited port state control has
been, it has nevertheless led to
the increasing deletion of sub-
standard ships from established
open registers and the introduc-
tion of more rigorous entry
requirements for registration.
These deletions and height-
ened entry standards have led to
the existence of a significant
number of ships temporarily
without flags but in need of one.
Without a flag, an asset cannot
trade legally. In these circum-
stances the owner has either to
scrap the ship, or find another
flag willing to take the rejects of
the big flags of convenience. This
is where registers such as Belize
and Cambodia enter the scene.
The established open registers
have closed a portion of the
market to themselves in order to
protect the profitability of the
register. Yet the invisible hand of
the market always finds a way of
filling niches, and the new
entrants can do just that by
picking up unwanted tonnage
considered too risky by the
Panamas and Liberias.
The decision by established
open registers to delete ships
likely to be detained by port state
control inspectors is a recogni-
tion of the increasingly successful
attempts to enforce international
standards. Shipowners wishing to
avoid deletion must conform to
minimum international stand-
ards, but this has cost implica-
tions. The net effect of this
process has been to slowly
increase standards in the estab-
lished open registers, although it
would be false to claim that
standards have risen consider-
ably across the board. This
increase in standards has left a
gap in the flag market both for
ships that have been deleted, and
shipowners who do not wish, or
who are unable, to cover the costs
of increased regulation. It is this
very space at the rock bottom of
the market that these new
registers enter and fight for
among themselves.
While the success of interna-
tional regulation has been
limited, it can be claimed that the
established open registers are part
of the network of international
regulatory bodies. Panama and
Liberia are, after all, among the
largest due-paying contributors to
the International Maritime
Organisation. By contrast, the
new registers operate outside
such bodies, and their success
shows, paradoxically, that the
enforcement of standards has led
to the further deregulation of a
part of the ship registration
market. This, in turn, has had a
negative effect on the quality of
shipping and  rights of seafarers.
